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The Continuing Relevance of the Establishment
Clause: A Reply to Professor Richard C. Schragger
Caroline Mala Corbin*
There is no doubt, as Professor Richard C. Schragger points out, that the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause principles are underenforced.' How
else to explain, for example, why the Supreme Court has held that the state
may not endorse religion or favor some religions over others,2 yet
government officials regularly make religious pronouncements, prayers to
Jesus Christ occur during presidential inaugurations,4 and our national pledge
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEXAS L.
REv. 583, 585 (2011). Professor Schragger discusses both the underenforcement of the
Establishment Clause, where the Court could but does not enforce Establishment Clause norms, and
the irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, where the Establishment Clause does not apply because
state action is lacking. Id. at 587-615. Because Professor Schragger's analysis focuses more on
underenforcement than irrelevance, I will follow suit. Thus, I discuss the Court's failure to
rigorously enforce the Lemon purpose prong and the ban on endorsement rather than the right of
religious groups to lobby and politicians to solicit from religious groups (a concern with religious-
political alliances), as the latter two are private actions to which the Constitution does not apply.
2. See, e.g.. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky.. 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (noting that "the 'First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion"' (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97. 104 (1968))).
3. Schragger, supra note 1, at 598 & n.61.
4. Terry Mattingly, Prayer in the Political Arena Comes Under Many Watchful Eyes, SCRIPPS
HOWARD NEWS SERV., Sept. 6, 2008, at B3, available at 9/6/08 PRESSATLC B3 (Westlaw)
(noting that Reverend Franklin Graham at George W. Bush's first inauguration closed his prayer
with "May this be the beginning of a new dawn for America as we humble ourselves before you and
acknowledge you alone as our Lord, our Savior and our Redeemer. .. . We pray this in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen."): Rachel Zoll.
Religious References at Obama's Inauguration Certainly Ran the Gamut, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
24, 2009, at B3, available at 1/24/09 PRESSATLC B3 (Westlaw) (reporting that "[Pastor] Warren
said Jesus' name in four languages-English, Spanish. Arabic and Hebrew-and ended his
invocation with 'The Lord's Prayer,' from ... Jesus Christ's Sermon on the Mount.").
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and national motto both invoke God?' In addition, the Court does not
regulate religious-political alliances and has been unwilling to examine the
actual intent of lawmakers, despite a prohibition on laws passed with a
6predominantly religious purpose.
In his excellent article, Professor Schragger offers several possible
explanations for his examples of underenforcement. To start, the Supreme
Court may be underenforcing its constitutional principles for pragmatic
reasons: If too unpopular, decisions striking down a much beloved religious
practice may go unenforced, and the Court's prestige and legitimacy called
into question.' Alternatively, Professor Schragger argues, enforcement might
trigger such a backlash that it would cause more harm than good.' In other
words, underenforcement may better accomplish the Establishment Clause's
goal of minimizing divisiveness. Professor Schragger also argues that the
Court is not institutionally competent to ferret out religious motives in part
because actual motive is to some extent unknowable, and in part because it
requires delimiting a precise line between secular and religious justifications,
a task that courts are reluctant to perform, especially given "a world of
disputed first principles about the appropriate foundations of the law."9
As powerful as these explanations may be in many circumstances, I
would like to offer some additional ones. The Court's reliance on plausible
reasons rather than actual reasons may be more simply explained by the fact
that state actions with an objectively persuasive secular justification do not
cause the type of problems that the Establishment Clause aims to avoid.
Meanwhile, the Court's reluctance to rule on the religious pronouncements of
individual government officials may be due to the private speech rights that
government workers retain despite their public role. Finally, fear of another
kind of backlash-a backlash against religious minorities-may motivate
underenforcement of existing Establishment Clause doctrine.
5. Cf Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2004) (discussing the origins
of the Pledge of Allegiance and congressional revisions that added "under God" to its text); id. at 29
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (recounting the history of In God We Trust" and its placement on
legal tender).
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7. See Schragger. supra note 1, at 617 (noting Justice Scalia's expression of this concern (citing
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
8. See id. at 619.
9. Id. at 624. Professor Schragger also argues that Establishment Clause principles may be
underenforced because, at least with regard to private speech, they are less important than free
speech and the democratic-process values that free speech furthers. See id at 626 ("[S]peech rights
trump nonestablishment concerns."). This might better be an argument for irrelevance, since under
current doctrine the Establishment Clause does not generally apply to private speech. See Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (noting the difference between "government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion.
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect" (emphasis omitted)).
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Nonetheless, pragmatic concerns about judicial legitimacy and political
backlash remain, as well as concern about the courts interfering with
democratic deliberation. With these issues in mind, Professor Schragger
makes several suggestions for managing establishment, though often with
significant caveats.' 0  He ultimately recommends "decentraliz[ing]
establishment," an approach whose main thrust is that challenges to federal
actions should be scrutinized more closely than local challenges.'' He argues
that, among other things, this decentralization will better ensure religious
pluralism, a key component of disestablishment, and better limit religious
divisiveness, a major goal of disestablishment. I am not, however, as
persuaded as Professor Schragger that the structural benefits of
decentralization are worth the trade-off of partially abandoning
disestablishment at the local level. In addition, decentralizing establishment,
with its greater attention to backlash and greater lenience toward
endorsement, gives short shrift to another major goal of the Establishment
Clause: protecting religious minorities.
I. Alternate Explanations for Underenforcement
A. Doctrine
One of Professor Schragger's main examples of the underenforcement
of Establishment Clause doctrine is the Court's reluctance to examine actual
purpose. Under the Lemon v. Kurtzmanl3 test, state action violates the
Establishment Clause if it is not predominantly motivated by a secular
purpose.14 Professor Schragger interprets the current doctrine to mean that
whenever a legislature votes for a law for predominantly religious reasons,
the Establishment Clause has been violated." As a consequence, the Court
10. First, courts could abandon rather than underenforce Establishment Clause doctrine, and
rely on other constitutional doctrines instead, although such an approach would be unable to
vindicate all disestablishment values. Schragger. supra note 1. at 630-35. Second, courts could
keep the current doctrine but be especially sensitive to issues of backlash. Id. at 635. While
Professor Schragger questions the usefulness of this approach given the impossibility of predicting
the consequences of any particular decision, he nonetheless concludes that "a general theory of
judicial review that emphasizes the Court's role in lowering the stakes of politics is attractive in the
Establishment Clause context." Id. at 639. Third, courts should allow religious symbols and focus
their Establishment Clause restrictions on the state's funding of religion. Id. at 640-41. Yet, there
is no guarantee that striking religious symbols is more divisive or that a permissive approach
towards symbols will not prefigure a permissive approach towards money. Id. at 641.
11. Id. at 642.
12. Id. at 643.
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Id. at 612-13.
15. Schragger, supra note 1, at 585-86 (using the Court's failure to prevent legislatures from
adopting laws on the basis of religious reasons as an example of the underenforcement of the
Establishment Clause). In other words, to pass a law based primarily on the belief that God requires
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regularly underenforces the Establishment Clause because, except in cases
that are on their face obviously motivated by religion, 1 6 it does not scrutinize
what actually motivates passage of a law that, for example, provides
assistance to the homeless.17
As Professor Schragger acknowledges, the Court's wariness about
delving into actual intent is not limited to the Establishment Clause."
Unique to the Religion Clauses, however, is the Court's reluctance to
distinguish between a religious and a secular purpose in difficult cases. 19
After all, is a law justified by "public reasons"-an Enlightenment concept
that itself reflects a particular religious worldview-ultimately relying on
religious or secular reasons? 20
However, there may be a more straightforward explanation for the
Court's reliance on an objectively determined purpose rather than actual
purpose when applying the first prong of the Lemon test: Laws that are
perceived as having been passed with a predominantly secular purpose, even
when the actual purpose is religious, do not cause the types of harms that the
Establishment Clause was designed, or at least today is widely understood, to
prevent.21 First, because civil strife tends to ensue whenever the state favors
one religion over others, the Establishment Clause protects the stability of the
22civil society. Second, the Establishment Clause protects the religion that
becomes established from the corruption and degradation that so often
it would violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 592 ("Government actions that are animated
solely by a religious purpose . . . are unconstitutional under the Lemon test.").
16. Patently religious cases include state-sponsored prayer and state-sponsored Ten
Commandments displays. Id at 594.
17. Nor do the courts police in any way religious groups that lobby for laws based on their
religious commandments. Id. at 585-86. However, actions of private groups are not covered by the
Establishment Clause, and the focus of this reply is the underenforcement of the Establishment
Clause, not its irrelevance. See supra note 9.
18. Reliance on actual purpose would require pinpointing what counts as the actual purpose
behind legislation passed by dozens of people, each of whom might have a different actual purpose.
And this is assuming courts could determine what motivates particular legislators. See Schragger,
supra note 1. at 620-21 (discussing the Court's reluctance to engage in 'judicial psychoanalysis"
(quoting McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)). Reliance on actual purpose
would also create the dilemma of how to analyze legislation that had been passed anew with a
different legislative history.
19. Id. at 621.
20. See id. at 622-23 ("Behind the 'reason' of Enlightenment political philosophy there was
often a foundational deism of a particularly Protestant kind.").
21. While the original understanding of the Establishment Clause is open to debate, these goals
comport with the current understanding of the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., McCreary Cny., 545 U.S. at 876 ("The Framers and the citizens of their time
intended ... to guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when the government weighs in on
one side of religious debate . . . ." (internal citation omitted)).
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accompany an alliance with the state.23 Third, the Establishment Clause
protects those who do not share the established religion's beliefs, as,
currently and historically, persecution or discrimination too often follows
24when the state prefers one religion to others.
None of these goals are threatened by state action whose objective
purpose seems secular, such as a law to aid the homeless, even if secretly all
legislators were actually motivated by the teachings of Jesus Christ. Such a
law appears secular, minimizing any divisiveness.25 Compared to a state-
sponsored creche or a mention of God, whose religious significance has been
diluted by claims that the symbols are not deeply religious, it does not risk
degrading religion because there is no representation of religion or claims
about religiosity. And religious minorities do not risk having religious law
imposed on them because they can understand the law in secular terms, i.e., it
is ethical to help homeless men, women, and children.26 Thus, interpreting
the Lemon test as only requiring the appearance of a predominantly secular
motive suffices to accomplish Establishment Clause goals. For this reason,
one might argue that Lemon never in fact required examination of actual
psychological intent of individual legislators rather than intent gleaned from
evident facts.
But what about laws that bar stem-cell research or discriminate against
gays and lesbians? 7 These are laws that are motivated predominantly by
religious reasons, yet have not been struck down on Establishment Clause
grounds. Here, Professor Schragger's example of underenforcement has
more traction. Yet the underenforcement problem is not that the courts have
been unwilling to uncover actual motive. Rather, the problem is that the
courts are too willing to find a predominately secular justification when it is
23. See, e.g.. Bowen v. Kendrick. 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J.. dissenting)
("The First Amendment protects not only the State from being captured by the Church, but also
protects the Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for its purposes.").
24. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919, 923 (2004) ("[T]he protection and equal status of minority faiths and adherents is a significant
purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole or conclusive one.").
25. Professor Schragger quotes Justice Souter as arguing that there is "'no reason for great
constitutional concern' when a lawmaker has a 'secret [religious] motive,' . . . because a secret
motive does not constitute a 'divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious
sides."' Schragger, supra note 1, at 621 (alteration in original) (citing McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at
863).
26. McCreary Cnty, 545 U.S. at 863 ("A secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to
make outsiders of nonadherents . . . .").
27. For example, a majority of states will not grant marriage licenses to gays and lesbians. See
infra note 57 and accompanying text. And while all states now allow single gays and lesbians to
adopt, see infra note 30, several limit second-parent and joint adoptions to married couples.
Adoption by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents: An Overview of Current Law, NAT'L CENTER.
FOR LESBIAN RTs.. 2 (Oct. 2010). http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/adptn02O4.pdf?
doclD=1221.
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obvious that secular concerns do not predominate. In other words, there
has been a failure to enforce the requirement of an evident and predominant
secular justification. Granted, this underenforcement claim is more a
difference in emphasis, but it is a difference nonetheless.
Furthermore, even this type of underenforcement may be fading. More
than one court has struck down laws discriminating against gays and lesbians
as failing rational basis scrutiny. Most recently, a district court in California,
after noting the religious belief "that gay and lesbian relationships are
sinful," ruled that "Proposition 8 fails to advance any rational basis in
singling out gay men and lesbians for denial of a marriage license."
Similarly, a Florida appeals court ruled that there was no rational basis for
30
prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting children. While requiring a
rational and, therefore, presumably secular justification for legislation is not
equivalent to requiring a predominantly secular justification, at least some
courts seem to be moving in the direction of closer scrutiny of the reasons
behind religiously motivated laws that disadvantage gays and lesbians.
B. Free Speech Concerns
Another major example Professor Schragger gives of the Court's
underenforcement is religious endorsement by government officials. While
an administrative agency cannot assert that "America is a Christian Nation,"
government officials have,31 and former President George W. Bush even
stated that he was called by God to run for the presidency.32 Notably, most
endorsement cases involve government displays rather than speech by
individual government officials. In explanation, Professor Schragger
acknowledges some reasons other than political pragmatism, such as
justiciability concerns about challenging fleeting remarks not likely to be
repeated.
28. The argument that gays and lesbians should not get married for the sake of any potential
children is often made. See, e.g.. Hernandez v. Robles. 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he
Legislature could rationally proceed on the common-sense premise that children will do best with a
mother and father in the home."). All reputable studies, however, have refuted the claim that having
gay parents harms children. E.g., Timothy J. Biblarz & Judith Stacey. How Does the Gender of
Parents Matter?, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 3, 17 (2010).
29. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 985, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal
pending, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 6, 2010), certifying question to Cal. Sup. Ct., 628 F.3d
1191; see also id. at 1002 ("A private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex
couples is not a proper basis for legislation.").
30. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Florida was the last state that barred individual gays and lesbians from
adopting children. See Adoption by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents: An Overview of Current
Law, supra note 27, at 2 ("Until recently, Florida was the only state that categorically prohibited
lesbians and gay individuals from becoming adoptive parents by statute." (citation omitted)).
31. Schragger. supra note 1. at 598 & n.61.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 599.
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I would like to mention another explanation. Doctrinally, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly observed that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses protect." 34  Thus, official state monuments are
government speech subject to Establishment Clause analysis, while
statements made by candidates on the campaign trail are private speech
protected by the Free Speech Clause.
Speech by elected officials, however, is more complicated because,
unlike government displays or candidate statements, it resists categorization
as purely government speech or purely private speech. Despite its mixed
nature, it may be that courts do not police religious rhetoric made by
government officials because they view it more along the lines of private
speech, where religious speech is actually protected. After all, government
officials do not completely forfeit their free speech rights when they enter
public service. Otherwise, a President would have to give up his or her
religious practices upon assuming office. Still, it is not an entirely
satisfactory conclusion, because the government component of the speech
creates an air of endorsement, especially in contexts like national
inaugurations.
There is no easy solution to the challenge of how to treat speech that is
both private and governmental36: Should the Court attempt to disentangle the
private and public components, or should it come up with a different set of
rules for this type of mixed speech?37 In any event, given judicial tolerance
for official legislative prayers, God in the national pledge and motto, and
state religious displays,38 the underenforcement of endorsement norms is not
limited to the mixed private-government speech of government officials.
34. Bd. ofEduc. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226. 250 (1990).
35. A statement made by the President that he was called by God to run perhaps ought to be
considered private speech.
36. Free speech claims by government employees also must address this complicated issue.
Until the recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). the Supreme Court would
balance the competing public and private interests. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968) (explaining the balancing test). Garcetti, however, established the rule that speech made
pursuant to official duties would count as government speech. 547 U.S. at 421. It is not clear
whether it follows that speech not made pursuant to official duties is always private speech, or even
whether Establishment Clause doctrine would adopt these rules.
37. See generally, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental. 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 605 (2008) (discussing mixed speech as a category separate from
private or governmental speech).
38. See Schragger, supra note 1, at 604 n.102 (noting the Court's decision in Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), which rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to legislative
prayer); id at 599-600 (detailing the Court's avoidance of the question of whether the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause in Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)); id. at 604 & n. 101 (discussing instances in which religious
displays have been '"grandfathered in' or considered de minimis").
2010] 131
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Thus, Professor Schragger is spot-on in his analysis of a de facto
establishment and an unofficial but powerful privileging of not only religion
but of certain religions over others, namely Christianity, or at the very least,
monotheistic religions. It is here that his explanations and prescriptions are
most needed.
C. Backlash Against Protecting Religious Minorities
In Professor Schragger's political pragmatism explanation for
underenforcement, 39 he mentions two types of possible backlash. For both,
court decisions enforcing Establishment Clause norms may be so unpopular
that they cause more harm than good. First, he discusses the Supreme
Court's worry about its own prestige and abilities as a political actor, and
40how it may be undermined by an unenforceable decision. Second, he posits
that full compliance could actually be more damaging to the goals of the
Establishment Clause than the state action originally challenged 4' So, for
example, ordering removal of an extant Ten Commandments monument may
cause more political divisiveness than letting it stand.42
However, avoiding political divisiveness is not the only Establishment
Clause value. Consequently, the concern that backlash would further divide
the country along religious lines should be joined by the fear of undermining
other establishment goals in making a case for underenforcement. In other
words, it is possible that courts decide against full compliance lest it
exacerbate the corruption or degradation of the favored religion or worsen
the position of religious minorities. In his discussion on managing
establishment, Professor Schragger notes that many believe Roe v. Wade43
may have hurt women and their reproductive rights by helping to spark the
growth of the religious right.44  Similarly, perhaps part of the Court's
calculus is that full enforcement of the Establishment Clause may unleash so
much wrath against those who it is supposed to protect or provoke such a
reactionary response that religious minorities would actually fare better with
an underenforced Establishment Clause. Professor Schragger may mean to
encompass the effects on religious minorities as part of his discussion of
political divisiveness, but he does not do so explicitly. His failure to consider
with care this important part of the Establishment Clause also raises concerns
about his suggestions for managing establishment.
39. Id at 617 20.
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
42. Schragger, supra note 1. at 618, 619-20 (discussing the "political nondivisiveness"
motivation in Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden, which upheld the display of a Texas
monument containing the Ten Commandments).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Schragger, supra note 1. at 635 (noting the theory that "a politically active Religious Right
developed in response to the liberalizing 'anti-religion' decisions of the Warren Court").
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II. Assumptions Underlying Decentralized Establishment
Professor Schragger offers several approaches for managing
establishment in the face of political realities, including (1) abandoning
certain establishment norms, 45 (2) ruling with an eye to possible backlash,
and (3) enforcing limits on funds to religion much more strictly than limits
on endorsement of religion. In the end, Professor Schragger advocates
decentralizing establishment, by which he means that challenges to local
actions would be scrutinized more deferentially than challenges to federal
action.46 According to Professor Schragger, this structural approach to
establishment, which incorporates aspects of the previous proposals, will
promote "American-style religious pluralism," reduce political tensions, and
prevent "a stable oppressive faction in the whole."47
It is an intriguing proposal, with many fascinating complexities. Yet,
some of the assumptions underlying Professor Schragger's favored solution
of decentralizing establishment deserve a closer look. First, it assumes the
decrease in decentralization caused by full enforcement of Establishment
Clause norms is more detrimental than the partial abandonment of these
norms. Second, it privileges the Establishment Clause goal of avoiding
divisiveness over other Establishment Clause goals. Third, it assumes that
funding of religion is more problematic than endorsement of religion.
A. Decentralization Benefits Outweigh Abandonment Harms
Among its benefits, decentralization provides two structural means of
ensuring that no one religious sect dominates. First, decentralization of
political power promotes pluralism, including religious pluralism.48 Second,
a decentralized political structure also means one religious group cannot take
over the central authority and exert its influence (and vice versa) because
there is no one central authority. 4 9 These are both praiseworthy goals, but I
wonder if their importance is not overstated, and if the trade-off of partial
abandonment of enforcing establishment norms at the local level is worth it.
Certainly the proliferation of sects is one way to ensure that no single
one becomes dominant, and decentralization contributes to their
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Professor Schragger first suggests that if
Establishment Clause doctrine cannot be enforced, perhaps it should be abandoned, especially since
other constitutional doctrines like equal protection would pick up the slack. Schragger. supra note
1, at 632 34. But given that the Establishment Clause already embodies an equal protection
component, there is no reason to think that the reasons currently causing underenforcement would
be any different for enforcement of equal protection. People who feel strongly about the issue are
unlikely to be much more receptive to removing God from the pledge and national motto because
the equality component is more explicit.
46. See supra note II and accompanying text.
47. Schragger. supra note 1. at 642-43.
48. Id. at 643.
49. Id.
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multiplication. Nonetheless, does having the courts enforce uniform
establishment norms at the local level really alter the decentralized nature of
our political structure to such a degree that it would affect the dynamics
leading to diverse associations? Especially if the establishment norms were
designed to encourage religious diversity by removing government coercion
or influence in the religious sphere?
In short, it is not altogether clear which background conditions better
encourage religious diversity within a locality: a decentralized regime where,
because disestablishment is weakly enforced, the government endorses the
dominant religion, or a similar regime except that disestablishment norms
here as elsewhere are more rigorously enforced, so that no one particular
religion is favored by the state.
Nor does decentralizing establishment necessarily encourage religious
diversity across localities. The reality is that if enforcement of Establishment
Clause norms is partially abandoned at the local level, the overwhelming
majority of American communities will favor Christianity. Yet arguably the
religious diversity most needed in the twenty-first century United States is
not one Christian sect checking another, but other religions checking
Christianity.
B. Privileging Avoidance ofDivisiveness
Professor Schragger also argues that decentralizing establishment will
reduce the political stakes and therefore will reduce political divisiveness.
Deferential scrutiny of challenges at the local level means local and state
controversies will no longer become national issues, which will lessen or at
least contain the potential backlash and divisiveness that can follow. 0 In
addition, because there will be multiple sites for decision making about
religious disputes instead of just one, the stakes of any one controversy
simply will not be as high.51 But again, I wonder whether uncertain backlash
is preferable to certain underenforcement. Furthermore, the focus on
divisiveness misses other important Establishment Clause concerns.
1. Uncertainty of Backlash.-It is true that making a federal case out
of a religious issue may risk divisiveness and backlash. An unpopular
decision may spur a reactionary political movement 52 or even a constitutional
amendment that would preclude full enforcement at a later date.
Decentralized decisions may help to avoid this, particularly if they are made
with an eye to political backlash, as Professor Schragger suggests.
50. See id. at 643 (noting that decentralization reduces religious tension by avoiding the
national politicization of local religion-state controversies).
51. See id. at 643-44 (noting that by accounting for scale, decentralizing establishment might
be able to reduce the political stakes).
52. See, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Yet Professor Schragger acknowledges the tremendous difficulty in
predicting backlash. 3 It is possible that fuller enforcement of the
Establishment Clause may trigger forces that work against its goals. At the
same time, it is also possible that consistent, uniform enforcement may help
54entrench Establishment Clause norms across the country. The same
uncertainty bedevils the gay rights movement, whose experience is
particularly suggestive since opposition to homosexuality is so intimately
tied to religious views. Accordingly, has judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage advanced or hindered the civil
rights of gays and lesbians? Of course, this question assumes that judicial
decisions have influence." But if they do, what has followed greater
enforcement of equal protection? On the one hand, one could argue that but
for the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision holding that laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii,56 Congress would never
have passed the Defense of Marriage Act,57 and over half of the states would
not have amended their constitutions to explicitly limit marriage to one man
and one women." On the other hand, perhaps this early decision and others
like it'9 helped pave the way to the legalization of same-sex marriage in six
states,60 and contributed to the sea change in the public's attitude toward gays
53. Schragger, supra note 1, at 637 ("It ... seems unlikely that Justices will be able to
accurately predict when a decision will generate a backlash.").
54. Or. alternately, full enforcement might produce a backlash to the backlash along the lines of
Professor Michael Klarman's argument that while Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), did not advance the civil rights struggle as much as many believe, the reaction to the
violence sparked by Brown did. Schragger, supra note 1, at 637 (citing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIm CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 441-42 (2004)).
55. See Schragger, supra note 1, at 637-38 & nn.250-53 (discussing the influence of Brown
and Roe).
56. Baehr v. Lewin. 852 P.2d 44. 67 (Haw. 1993).
57. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA) essentially bans same-sex marriage for federal purposes by defining marriage as a union
between a man and woman. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). DOMA also gives states the right to allow or ban
same-sex marriage and the right to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
58. Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (June 27, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 [hereinafter Same-
Sex Marriage] (identifying states with constitutional language defining marriage). In addition,
thirty-nine states have statutes banning same-sex marriage. See id. (identifying states with statutes
that define marriage as between a man and a woman).
59. E.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that the right to marry the partner of one's choosing is a
fundamental right and a ban on same-sex marriage is subject to strict scrutiny); Baker v. State. 744
A.2d 864, 885-86 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the denial of benefits to same-sex couples equal to those
of married couples violates the Vermont constitution).
60. Massachusetts, Connecticut. California, Iowa. New York. Vermont, New Hampshire, and
the District of Columbia allow same-sex couples to marry. Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 58; see
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6 1and lesbians. Again, the relationship between the courts, political actors,
and the public is a complicated one, with influences flowing in multiple
directions. But given the recent and popular repeal of Don't Ask, Don't
Tell 62 and predictions that public support for same-sex marriage is an
63inevitability, perhaps the fear of backlash is overstated.
2. Other Establishment Clause Goals. Privileging the value of
political nondivisiveness, as Professor Schragger advises, also overlooks
other Establishment Clause values. 64  Professor Schragger praises Justice
Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden v. Perry as an example of the Court
attempting to lower the political stakes. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer
"interpreted the Establishment Clause as a mandate to avoid sectarian
strife" 66 and reasoned that removing the Ten Commandments would cause
more strife than letting them stand.
also Sandhya Somashekhar. New York Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage in Win for Gay Rights
Activists. WASH. POST, June 24, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-york-senate-
votes-to-legalize-same-sex-marriage-in-win-for-gay-rights-advocates/2011/06/15/AG3XDqijH story
.html (updated June 25. 2011). Several other states either recognize same-sex marriages performed
in other states, allow civil unions, or provide benefits to same-sex couples. Same-Sex Marriage.
supra note 58. The status of same-sex marriage in California depends on the outcome of litigation
surrounding Proposition 8. Id.
61. In 1996. 27% supported and 65% opposed same-sex marriage. Support For Same-Sex
Marriage Edges Upward: Majority Continues to Favor Gays Serving Openly in Military, PEw RES.
CENTER (Oct. 6, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/662/same-sex-marriage. In 2011, a mere
fifteen years later, a majority of Americans support same-sex marriage. Nate Silver. Gay Marriage
Opponents Now in Minority, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 20, 2011), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/04/20/gay-marriage-opponents-now-in-minority/.
62. A CNN poll of the American public found 72% favored allowing gays and lesbians to serve
openly in the military, with 23% opposed. CNN OPINION RESEARCH POLL 4 (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/2010/images/ I/I 17/rell6e.pdf.
63. Vice President Joe Biden, for example, has remarked, "I think the country [is] evolving, ....
and I think there's an inevitability for a national consensus on gay marriage." David Lightman,
Biden Sees Gay Marriage Consensus, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/12/25/1988041 /biden-sees-gay-marriage-consensus.html; see
also Nathan Black, Christians Need to Prepare for Normalization of Gay Marriage, THE
CHRISTIAN POST (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.christianpost.com/news/christians-need-to-prepare-
for-normalization-of-gay-marriage-49195/ (reporting that the President of the Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary recently acknowledged, "I think it's clear that something like same-sex
marriage is going to be normalized, legalized, and recognized in the culture." (internal quotations
omitted)).
64. See infra note 65; cf Schragger, supra note 1, at 639 ("[A] general theory of judicial review
that emphasizes the Court's role in lowering the stakes of politics is attractive in the Establishment
Clause context.").
65. 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
66. Schragger, supra note 1, at 637; see also id. at 620 (noting that "[o]ne could agree that ...
the principle of nondivisiveness requires the Court to permit the display [of the Ten
Commandments] in Van Orden," and adding that '"[t]his result would be justified by a norm of
nonestablishment that privileges the value of political nondivisiveness and understands the Court to
be a central contributor to that state of affairs").
67. Id. at 636-37.
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But as discussed above, the consequences of a decision are extremely
difficult to predict. Perhaps in the short term, allowing a Ten
Commandments monument would be less divisive in a community where
most people want to keep it, if only because the Christian majority is willing
and able to make more of a ruckus than the religious minorities who live
there. In the long term, however, a clear rule that state-sponsored displays of
the Ten Commandments carry a presumption of unconstitutionality68 might
better avoid the endless litigation and conflict surrounding the issue.69
Additionally, a presumptive rule against government-sponsored religious
monuments in general would prevent religious groups from competing for
scarce government resources.
Even assuming that a permissive approach to state Ten Commandment
monuments reduces conflict, minimizing political strife is only one goal of
the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause strictures on keeping
church and state separate are also meant to prevent the debasement of the
favored religion. It degrades religion to insist that the predominant effect
of displaying a sacred text or symbol is not religious but secular,7 which
Justice Breyer argues in his concurrence . Likewise, allowing prayers but
68. In other words, state-sponsored Ten Commandments would be presumed unconstitutional
unless in a context that very clearly highlights some secular import, such as a display in an art
museum or a discussion in a world religions class. Cf B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and
Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 714, 758
(2010) (arguing that courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption of religious meaning when
confronted with a "facially religious phrase").
69. Professor Schragger acknowledges this concern when he observes, "The very ambiguity of
the Court's decisions may inflame the ongoing political and cultural debate." Schragger, supra note
1, at 369; see also Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972. 974-75 (2010) (noting that in the twenty-five years following
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), "legislative prayer has grown into a fissure that now
divides county boards, state legislatures, and city councils across the country" and that "[1]itigation
has . . . become an omnipresent threat and a frequent reality").
70. It is also meant to prevent corruption of the favored religion. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1. 13 (1984) ("To suggest that the [creche] ... is not a religious symbol clearly demeans the
religion of those who erected it.").
72. See Van Orden v. Perry. 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer. J.. concurring) ("Here the
tablets have been used as part of a display that communicates not simply a religious message, but a
secular message as well. The circumstances surrounding the display's placement on the capitol
grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the latter, nonreligious aspects
of the tablet's message to predominate."). Likewise, it does religion no honor to describe
invocations to God in the national pledge and national motto as patriotic rather than religious
statements, as courts upholding them against Establishment Clause challenges invariably have done.
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing such references as being employed "for essentially secular purposes," such
as "commemorat[ing] the role of religion in our history").
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insisting that they be nondenominational means watering down religion to an
73extent unacceptable to many.
In addition, the Establishment Clause is not just about preventing
conflicts between sects; it is also about protecting minority religions.
Establishment Clause challenges often represent a less powerful religious
minority challenging a government benefit to a more powerful religious
majority. In the Van Orden Ten Commandments case, the government
endorsed Christianity,7 4 the ascendant religion in Texas and the United
States. By favoring and valorizing Christianity, this endorsement arguably
treats all other religions as second class. Thus, Justice Breyer's concurrence
can be read as allowing the dominant religious group to retain its privilege at
the expense of less powerful religious groups. Granted, courts cannot make
decisions that are so despised that they are unenforceable.75  At the same
time, protecting minorities sometimes means decisions that the majority will
not like and will complain about. Consequently, finding the Ten
Commandments monument unconstitutional or otherwise enforcing
establishment norms may be unwelcome. Nonetheless, if a state monument
causes the types of harm that the Establishment Clause is understood to
protect against, then, barring political unfeasibility, the court should order its
removal. Between minimizing strife and protecting minorities, the latter
should prevail, especially if the former is speculative.
C. Funding More Problematic Than Endorsement
While it is not clear whether there is something about decentralization
itself that would lead to higher scrutiny for funding rather than endorsement,
Professor Schragger also argues that government funding of religion causes
76more establishment ills than government endorsement of religion. Yet for
many of the reasons Professor Schragger himself mentions, focusing
73. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAuL L. REV. 373, 380
(1992) ("By stripping all the specific elements of different faiths and denominations and attempting
to keep only the common elements that all faiths share, tolerant governments produce a mishmash
that no faith can accept or believe in.").
74. While the Ten Commandments are also part of the Jewish faith, the Jewish version is
different than the version usually challenged. For example, typically, the First Commandment in
the Jewish faith is. "I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt." whereas the
version in Van Orden, "I am the LORD thy God," makes no mention of the Exodus. Steven Lubet,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 475 (1998) (providing the Jewish version of the First Commandment);
ef Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717-18, 718 n.16 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) ("There are many distinctive
versions of the Decalogue [and] ... these differences may be of enormous religious significance.").
75. Although, since the Supreme Court had held that other religious displays violated the
Establishment Clause. e.g. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter. 492 U.S.
573, 601-02 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche in a county courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause), proclaiming a Ten Commandments monument unconstitutional does not
seem to fall into that category.
76. Schragger, supra note 1, at 644 (arguing that the "funding of religious [institutions and
organizations] ... is generally more dangerous than local religious endorsements").
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enforcement efforts in this way may not better reduce religious tensions."
Furthermore, this claim about the relative effects of funding versus
endorsement also underestimates the harms of endorsement.
There are a couple of reasons why stricter enforcement of funding and
laxer enforcement of endorsement may not reduce tensions as much as
Professor Schragger predicts. First, while forcing pubic officials and the
courts to take sides in highly emotional and fraught battles over religious
symbols can cause divisiveness, further underenforcement will not eliminate
the courts' involvement in these issues. Even Professor Schragger would
draw the line somewhere: I do not imagine that he would approve of
Christian crosses atop every government building or on every public school
wall. So really the question is not whether the courts must make these
decisions, but where to draw the line when they do. In the end, instead of
conflicts about whether to allow nonsectarian prayers before legislative
sessions-the issue resolved by the underenforcing Marsh v. Chambers78
the conflicts will be about whether to allow sectarian prayers before
79legislative sessions.
Second, Professor Schragger argues for stricter enforcement of funding
because "while government expression is important, it does not have the
political effect of money."80 If people care deeply about religious symbols,
however, religious groups may well compete for government endorsement to
the same degree they compete for government money. In any case, Professor
Schragger cannot have it both ways: Either religious symbols matter and so
will heighten tension and cause competition, or they do not.
Plus, people may actually object less to government funding of religion
than to government endorsement of religion. As Professor Schragger
recognizes, funding religion does not preclude the possibility of treating all
religions equally. While in reality the funding would flow unevenly, at least
in theory all belief systems are eligible. That is not the case with government
religious symbols. For example, it is impossible for a national motto to
endorse Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Wicca, secular
humanism, and atheism all at once. In addition, funding can more readily be
77. Id at 640 (asserting that "regulating symbols unnecessarily heightens religious tensions"
and that striking down the government's religiously infused speech both increases religious factions
and "foster[s] grievances that can be [politically] exploited"). Furthermore, money "raises the
political stakes" for religious groups and for politicians more than mere symbols. Id. at 640-41.
78. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
79. See, e.g.. Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263. 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (challenge to
sectarian legislative prayer); Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen.
Assembly, 506 F.3d 584. 586-87 (7th Cir. 2007) (challenge to legislative prayers): Simpson v.
Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276. 278-80 (4th Cir. 2005) (challenge to a policy
limiting legislative prayers to members of monotheistic religions); see also Turner v. City Council
of Fredericksburg. 534 F.3d 352, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2008) (city council member's challenge to a
policy requiring that legislative prayers be nondenominational).
80. Schragger. supra note 1. at 640.
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justified than endorsement. In the school voucher case, for example, the
purpose of government funding was to improve the educational opportunities
of children with no other immediate options." Again, this is not the case
with government-sponsored symbols: endorsement does not improve the
education or welfare of anyone, and there are always secular alternatives
available. Our national motto "In God We Trust," for example, could easily
be "E Pluribus Unum"8 2 or "Liberty And Justice For All."
Finally, Professor Schragger underestimates the establishment harms of
government-sponsored religious symbols. Government endorsement of
religion not only triggers religious conflict, it also creates religious
hierarchies. Government endorsement sends the message that those who do
not conform to the favored mainstream religious beliefs are less valued, or as
James Madison put it: "It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority." This can affect both how religious minorities view themselves
and how they are viewed by others. State endorsement may make religious
minorities feel alienated and therefore less likely to participate in civic and
community affairs.84 State endorsement may also exacerbate discrimination
against religious minorities. Members of mainstream religions often
already feel some distrust or suspicion of those who do not share their views
on religious truth;8 state endorsement may help cement these negative
views. After all, "In God We Trust" as a national motto implies that true
Americans trust in God and "everybody else is a little . . . un-American."8
81. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (describing the intent of a
scholarship program to provide assistance to the poor in a challenged school system).
82. And in fact, our national motto was "E Pluribus Unum" until it was changed during the
Cold War. Act of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 302
(2006)). "Under God" had been added to the Pledge of Allegiance two years earlier. Act of June
14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)).
83. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
reprinted in JANES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 33 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
84. Noah Feldman. From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 709 n.181 (2002) ("[T]he harm of endorsement is the actual reduction in
political equality that results from the psychological impact of the endorsement message on favored
and disfavored citizens alike.").
85. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Religious Speech, 97
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming).
86. 59% of registered voters said it was important to them that the President of the United
States has a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and a sizeable portion of Americans admit they
would not vote for a religious minority, even if qualified and nominated by their own party: 48%
would not vote for a Muslim; 24% would not vote for a Mormon; 51% would not vote for an
atheist. See Obama and God PRINCETON SURV. RES. ASSOCIATES INT'L, 7 (July 11. 2008),
available at http://www.psrai.com/filesave/0807%/20ftop%/20w%/20methodology.pdf (reporting
responses to questions regarding views on presidential candidates and religion).
See Laycock, supra note 73, at 380 ("By making such statements, the government says the real
American religion is watered-down Christianity, and everybody else is a little bit un-American.").
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Consequently, nonconforming religious minorities will be considered the less
preferable candidate for political office, employment, or anything else.
Endorsement does not only undermine the equality of religious
minorities, it may undermine their religious liberty as well. Imagine, for
example, that a town council opens its sessions with a monotheistic prayer.
A member of the town council or a citizen who does not share those beliefs is
confronted with a choice. She can either join the prayer and act contrary to
her belief system. Or she can refuse to join, out herself as a religious
minority, and suffer the consequences. And the consequences can be
severe.88 Thus, government endorsements can put pressure on members of
minority religions to act contrary to their religious conscience. This is no
minor injury. Arguably, government funding of religion can also impose
these pressures, 89 but that should lead to the conclusion that neither funding
of religion nor endorsement of religion should be countenanced under the
Establishment Clause.
III. Conclusion
This short Response has obviously not attempted to grapple with all the
many intricacies of Professor Schragger's rich and nuanced arguments.
Instead, it offers a few supplemental explanations for the Court's
underenforcement of Establishment Clause norms and suggests that closer
attention to other Establishment Clause values, especially its goal of
protecting religious minorities, might lead to conclusions different than those
drawn by Professor Schragger.
88. People in the United States have shown themselves to be reluctant to vote for, hire, or
associate with religious minorities. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
89. Parents in school districts with voucher programs may find themselves in this predicament:
Do they send their children to a failing public school, or do they take advantage of the voucher
program and send them to a religious school which will teach their children beliefs contrary to their
own religion?
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